

A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Grave

Risk Aversion and Life-Cycle Savings

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Motivation

- Question: How does risk aversion impact life-cycle saving and portfolio choice?
- First answer: Depends on the risks considered
 - Labor income risk: ↗
 - Financial return risk: depends on IES
 - Mortality risk: ↘
- With multiple risks: ambiguous
 - ⇒ Need quantitative analysis
- Focus on risk aversion + income, financial and mortality risks

Modelling approach

- Kreps-Porteus recursive preferences:
 - Epstein-Zin (1989)
 - Risk-sensitive: Hansen and Sargent (1995) in their work on robustness
 - Allow us to vary risk aversion without changing IES
- Quantitative life-cycle model with incomplete markets
- Partial equilibrium analysis
- Calibrated to U.S. data
- ... and in particular to value of a statistical life: Viscusi and Aldy (2003) for a review

Main results

- Higher risk aversion
 - Decreases life-cycle savings
 - Decreases participation in the stock market
 - Decreases the conditional share in stock
- With mortality risk, give up homotheticity of Epstein-Zin
 - intuition: we cannot "scale" death.
- Risk-sensitive and Epstein-Zin qualitatively similar and quantitatively close

Literature

<i>Risk aversion</i>	<i>... increases savings</i>	<i>... decreases savings</i>
Income risk	e.g., BCL	
Investment risk	Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) and BCL if $IES < 1$	Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) and BCL if $IES > 1$
Mortality risk	HPSA if $IES < 1$	Bommier (2006, 2013), BCL, Drouhin (2015), HPSA if $IES > 1$
All three risks	Gomes and Michaelides (2005, 2008),... ▶ more	This paper

- BCL: Bommier, Chassagnon, and LeGrand (2012)
- HPSA: Hugonnier, Pelgrin, and Saint-Amour (2012)

Relationship between risk aversion and savings (1/2)

Simple framework (see Bommier, Chassagnon, LeGrand, 2012)

- Consumption-saving problem with 2 periods: 0 and 1; 2 states in period 1: G and B
- Saving s_B (resp. s_G) if B (resp. G) for sure
- Saving s^* if uncertain future (B or G)

Role of risk aversion:

- $s^* =$ convex combination of s_B and s_G
 - Weight on s_B increases with risk aversion
- ⇒ the more risk averse, the more important bad state realizations

Relationship between risk aversion and savings (2/2)

- Income risk
 - Bad state = low income
 - $s_B > s_G$
 - Risk aversion *increases* savings.
- Mortality risk
 - Bad state = living for one period only
 - saving = bet on living 2 periods
 - $s_B < s_G$
 - Risk aversion *decreases* savings.
- Investment risk: depends on IES [▶ Show](#)

⇒ All three risks, ambiguous relationship → quantitative exercise

Back of the envelope calculation (1/2)

Magnitudes of income vs. mortality risks?

- Income risk from a lifecycle perspective
 - Lifecycle labor income = per period labor incomes discounted to age 20 at the risk-free rate
 - ⇒ With our calibration, average lifetime labor income of \$1.1 million with a standard deviation of \$0.8 million
 - ⇒ Income risk \approx \$0.8 million

Back of the envelope calculation (2/2)

Magnitudes of income vs. mortality risks?

- Mortality risk.

- Life expectancy at age 20 = 58.5 years with a standard deviation of 14.5 years.

⇒ Mortality risk \approx 14.5 years.

- Using the value of a statistical life, one year alive \approx \$186 k (VSL= \$6.5m at 45).

⇒ Mortality risk \approx \$2.7 millions.

⇒ Back of the envelope calculation: Mortality risk \ggg income risk

⇒ Impact of risk aversion should be dominated by mortality risk

- 1 Motivation and mechanisms
- 2 Model
- 3 Computation and calibration
- 4 Results
- 5 Conclusion and outlook

Endowments

- Working age $t = 1$, retirement age $t = T_R$, max age $t = T_M$
- Mortality risk: survival probabilities $(p_{t+1|t})_t$
- Labor income ($1 \leq t < T_R$)

$$y_t^L = y_0 \exp(\mu_t + \pi_t + \varepsilon_t^y)$$

$$\pi_t = \rho\pi_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^\pi$$

$$\varepsilon_t^y \stackrel{iid}{\sim} \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_y^2), \quad \varepsilon_t^\pi \stackrel{iid}{\sim} \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_\pi^2)$$

- Social security pension income ($T_R \leq t \leq T_M$), y^R

Asset markets

- Bond: risk-free gross return R^f

- Stock: risky gross return

$$\ln R_t^s = \ln (R^f + \nu) + \varepsilon_t^R, \quad \varepsilon_t^R \stackrel{iid}{\sim} \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_R^2)$$

- ε_t^R correlated with both labor income shocks with $\kappa_{R,y}$ and

$$\kappa_{R,\pi}$$

- No short-selling
- Stock-market participation cost, $F \geq 0$, paid once in life

Choices and constraints

- Choices $\{c_t, s_t, b_t, \eta_t\}$
- Constraints

$$c_t + b_t + s_t + F1_{\eta_t=1}1_{\eta_{t-1}=0} = y_t + R^f b_{t-1} + R_t^s s_{t-1},$$

$$y_t = \begin{cases} y_t^L & \text{if } t < t_R, \\ y_t^R & \text{else,} \end{cases}$$

$$s_t = 0 \text{ if } \eta_t = 0,$$

$$c_t > 0, \quad b_t \geq 0, \quad s_t \geq 0.$$

and bequests are $w_t = R^f b_{t-1} + R_t^s s_{t-1}$.

Preferences (1/2)

- Felicity (alive) from consumption: $u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma}$
- Felicity (dead) from bequests:

$$v(w) = -v_0 + \frac{\theta}{1-\sigma} \left[(\hat{w} + w)^{1-\sigma} - \hat{w}^{1-\sigma} \right]$$

- Kreps-Porteus recursive preferences

▶ General recursion

$$\begin{aligned} U_t^A &= (1 - \beta)u(c_t) \\ &+ \beta \Phi^{-1} \left(p_{t+1|t} \mathbb{E}_t \left[\Phi \left(U_{t+1}^A \right) \right] + (1 - p_{t+1|t}) \mathbb{E}_t \left[\Phi \left(U_{t+1}^D \right) \right] \right) \\ U_t^D &= (1 - \beta)v(w_t) + \beta v(0) \end{aligned}$$

Preferences (2/2)

Why is v_0 important?

- difference between being alive consuming 1 unit and being dead without leaving bequest
- strongly connected to the value of life
- cannot be set to zero without a loss of generality (and a strong constraint on value of life)
- does not “go away” with non-additive preferences
- (does not affect choices in case of additive preferences)

$$U_t^A = (1 - \beta)u(c_t) + \beta p_{t+1|t} \mathbb{E}_t [U_{t+1}^A] - \beta(1 - p_{t+1|t})v_0 \\ + (1 - p_{t+1|t})\beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[(1 - \beta) \frac{\theta}{1 - \sigma} \left[(\hat{w} + w)^{1-\sigma} - \hat{w}^{1-\sigma} \right] \right]$$

Epstein-Zin and risk-sensitive preferences (1/2)

- Both Kreps-Porteus
- Epstein-Zin preferences (EZ)

$$\Phi(u) = \frac{1}{1-\gamma} (1 + (1-\sigma)u)^{\frac{1-\gamma}{1-\sigma}} - \frac{1}{1-\gamma}, \quad \text{if } \gamma, \sigma \neq 1$$

- Risk-sensitive preferences (RS)

$$\Phi(u) = -\frac{1}{k} (\exp(-ku) - 1) \quad \text{if } k \neq 0$$

- Limit cases ($k = 0$, $\gamma = 1$, $\sigma = 1$) by continuity
- Coincide if
 - $\gamma = \sigma$ and $k = 0 \Rightarrow$ additively separable case
 - $\sigma = 1$

Epstein-Zin and risk-sensitive preferences (2/2)

- EZ: homothetic but not monotone (with respect to FSD)
- RS: non-homothetic but monotone.

⇒ Not monotone, what does that mean?

▶ Numerical Example

- RS: the only KP preferences that are monotone and disentangle risk aversion from IES
 - Working paper by Bommier and LeGrand (2014), work in progress by Bommier, Kochov, and LeGrand (2016)
- In our setting:
 - Homotheticity has to be given up, because of value of life.
 - Non-monotonicity little impact

Value of a statistical life

- Standard definition (see Johansson 2002): Marginal rate of substitution between survival rate and consumption

$$VSL_t = \frac{\frac{\partial U_t^A}{\partial p_{t+1|t}}}{\frac{\partial U_t^A}{\partial c_t}}$$

⇒ how much consumption to give up for increasing the likelihood to live one more year

- Viscusi and Aldy (2003) for empirical estimates

Computation

- Reformulate model
 - Cash-at-hand, $x_t = R^f b_{t-1} + R_t^s s_{t-1} + y_t$
 - Total savings, a_t , and share in stock $\alpha \in [0, 1]$
 - Persistent productivity, π_t : continuous state variable
 - State space (x_t, π_t, η_t, t)
 - Not differentiable
 - Standard VFI very long \rightarrow calibration hardly feasible.
- \Rightarrow Refinement of VFI
- \Rightarrow Use 3D cubic B-spline to interpolate expected continuation value
- Calibration: consider 3 agents: *add*, *EZ*, *RS*

Calibration of preferences

Parameter	Value	Source/ counterpart/ target
Inverse IES, σ	2.0	
Exog. endowment, \hat{w}	1.5	
Discount factor, β	0.96	$Assets_{45}^{add} = \text{US\$ } 100'000$
Life-death gap, v_0	30.0	$VSL_{45}^{add} = \text{US\$ } 6.5\text{m}$
Bequest motive, θ	20.0	$Bequests_{85}^{add}$
Risk aversion, EZ, γ	3.0	
Risk aversion, RS, k	0.08	$Assets_{45}^{RS} = Assets_{45}^{EZ}$


Parameterization of endowments and asset markets

Parameter	Value	Source/ counterpart/ target
Working age, retirement age, maximum age		21, 65, 100
Survival rates, $p_{t+1 t}$	$\{p_{t+1 t}\}_1^T$	U.S. mortality 2007, HMD
Age productivity, μ_t	$\{\mu_t\}_1^T$	Earnings profiles 2007, PSID
Average wage, y_0	21 756 USD	Net compensation 2007, SSA
Pensions, y_R	0.3	Replacement rate, preliminary
Autocorrelation, ρ	0.95	Storesletten, et al. (2004)
Var. persistent shocks, σ_π^2	0.03	Storesletten, et al. (2004)
Correlation with stock, $\kappa_{R,\pi}$	0.15	Gomes and Michaelides (2005)
Var. transitory shocks, σ_y^2	0.00	Preliminary
Inheritance, w_0	0.0	Preliminary
Gross risk-free return, R^f	1.01	Bond return, Shiller data
Equity premium, ν	0.02	Preliminary
Stock volatility, σ_R	0.18	Shiller data
Participation cost, F	0.2	Preliminary


Lifecycle profiles *without* mortality risk

- Only labor income and asset return risks

► Re-calibration




Total savings




Stock market participation

Lifecycle profiles *with* mortality risk (1/3)

- Baseline with all risks




Total savings




Stock market participation

Lifecycle profiles *with* mortality risk (2/3)

- Baseline with all risks




Total savings




Conditional Share in Stock

Lifecycle profiles *with* Mortality risk (3/3)

- Baseline with all risks



Consumption



Value of a Statistical Life

Typical Epstein-Zin specification

- Many different variants, e.g. [GM 2005](#). See [Literature Overview](#).

$$\Omega_t = \left((1 - \beta)c_t^{1-\sigma} + \beta \left(\mathbb{E}_t \left[p_{t+1|t} \Omega_{t+1}^{1-\gamma} + (1 - p_{t+1|t}) \theta w_{t+1}^{1-\gamma} \right] \right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{1-\gamma}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$


- Bequests explicit and homothetic,
- ... but VSL not necessarily > 0
- In our framework, set $v_0 = -\theta \frac{\hat{w}^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$ (and $\hat{w} = 0.0$)
- In addition, if no bequests: $\theta = 0$

If $\gamma > 1$: $\frac{\partial \Omega_t}{\partial p_{t+1|t}} < 0 \Rightarrow VSL < 0$. The term $+(1 - p_{t+1|t})(\infty)^{1-\gamma}$ can be added in the recursion, where ∞ = utility of death.


Typical Epstein-Zin specification, $\theta = 0$ (1/2)

- Like baseline with all risks

▸ Recalibration




Total savings




Stock market participation

Typical Epstein-Zin specification, $\theta = 0$ (2/2)



Consumption



Value of a Statistical Life

Conclusion

- Mortality = main risk in life
 - importance of value of life
 - saving = risk-taking behavior
 - Higher risk aversion decreases lifecycle savings
- EZ vs. RS
 - EZ can accommodate positive VSL, but lose homotheticity
 - Typical EZ implementation may yield negative VSL
- Observed low levels of saving may be rational and explained by higher risk-aversion. Alternative explanation to time-inconsistency (e.g., Caliendo and Findley, 2013)
- In paper, also explain the different results of Hugonnier, Pelgrin, and Saint-Amour (2012)

Thank you !

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Literature

- Epstein-Zin preferences:
 - With bequests: Gomes and Michaelides (2005), Inkman, Lopez, and Michaelides (2011), Horneff, Maurer, and Stamos (2008a, 2008b), Chai, Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell (2011)
 - Without bequests: Gomes and Michaelides (2008), Gomes, Michaelides, and Polkovnichenko (2009), Fehr and Habermann (2008), Fehr, Habermann, and Kindermann (2008) Fehr, Kallweit, and Kindermann (2013)
- Risk aversion and savings:

Bommier (2006, 2013), Bommier, Chassagnon, LeGrand (2012), Bhamra and Uppal (2006)
- Value of a statistical life:

Kaplow (2005), Viscusi and Aldy (2003), Bommier and Villeneuve (2010), Cordoba and Ripoll (2013)

Relationship Between Risk Aversion and Savings (3/3)

- Investment risk
 - Bad state = low rate of return
 - If $IES < 1$
 - Income effect dominates
 - $s_B > s_G$
 - Risk aversion *increases* savings
 - Else if $IES > 1$
 - Substitution effect dominates
 - $s_B < s_G$
 - Risk aversion *decreases* savings

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General Kreps-Porteus Recursion

- Recursion

$$U_t = (1 - \beta)u_t + \beta\Phi^{-1} \left(\mathbb{E}_t^{\mathcal{F} \times \mathcal{G}} [\Phi(U_{t+1})] \right),$$

$$\text{with } u_t = \begin{cases} u(c_t) & \text{if alive at } t \\ v(w_t) & \text{if dead at } t \end{cases}$$

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Numerical Example of Non-Monotonic Preferences

- Consider EZ utility: $V(c_0, \tilde{c}_1) = c_0^{\frac{1}{2}} + (\mathbb{E}[\tilde{c}_1^{-\frac{1}{2}}])^{-1}$.
- Lotteries $i = \ell_1, \ell_2$ paying off (c_0^i, c_d^i) or (c_0^i, c_u^i) (50%-50%):

Lottery	c_0^i	c_d^i	c_u^i	$V(c_0^i, c_d^i)$	$V(c_0^i, c_u^i)$
$i = \ell_1$	4	1	7	9.00	21.58
$i = \ell_2$	2	2.5	9	8.97	19.49

⇒ ℓ_1 always pays off more than ℓ_2 .

- BUT, ex ante, $V(c_0^{\ell_1}, \tilde{c}_1^{\ell_1}) = 11.91 < 12.15 = V(c_0^{\ell_2}, \tilde{c}_1^{\ell_2})!$

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Implications for consumption-saving problems

- Two states B , G , two periods, constant rate R
- $y_B < y_G$ and $s_B > s_G$
- With monotone preferences: $s_B > s_m^* > s_G$
- With EZ preferences, it may be the case that: $s_{EZ}^* > s_B > s_G$, while saving s_B offers a greater lifetime utility in both states B and G .

Re-calibration Without Mortality

Parameter	Value	Source/ counterpart/ target
Inverse IES, σ	2.0	
Exog. endowment, \hat{w}	1.5	
Discount factor, β	$0.96 \rightarrow 0.95$	$Assets_{45}^{add} = \text{US\$ } 100'000$
Life-death gap, v_0	$30.0 \rightarrow 30.3$	$VSL_{45}^{add} = \text{US\$ } 6.5\text{m}$
Bequest motive, θ	20.0	$Bequests_{85}^{add} = ?$
Risk aversion, EZ, γ	3.0 \rightarrow 7.0	
Risk aversion, RS, k	0.08 \rightarrow 0.58	$Assets_{45}^{RS} = Assets_{45}^{EZ}$

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EZ in Gomes and Michaelides 2005

$$V_t = \left((1 - \beta p_t) c_t^{1 - \frac{1}{\varepsilon}} + \beta E_t \left(p_t V_{t+1}^{1-\rho} + (1 - p_t) b \frac{(X_{t+1}/b)^{1-\rho}}{1 - \rho} \right)^{\frac{1 - \frac{1}{\varepsilon}}{1 - \rho}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \frac{1}{\varepsilon}}}$$

- Derivative ambiguous if $\rho > 1$ and $\varepsilon < 1$

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Re-calibration for 'typical' EZ Specification

Parameter	Value	Source/ counterpart/ target
Inverse IES, σ	2.0	
Exog. endowment, \hat{w}	1.5	
Discount factor, β	0.96	$Assets_{45}^{add} = \text{US\$ } 100'000$
Life-death gap, v_0	30.0 \rightarrow 0.0	not targeted
Bequest motive, θ	20.0 \rightarrow 0.0	exogenous
Risk aversion, EZ, γ	3.0 \rightarrow 7.0	
Risk aversion, RS, k	0.08 \rightarrow 0.71	$Assets_{45}^{RS} = Assets_{45}^{EZ}$

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